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Takings and the Right to Fish and Float in Colorado
AARON PETTIS*
INTRODUCTION
Colorado is the only state in the Intermountain West that does not have a clearly
defined and protected right for the public to float on streams that pass through
private land.1 While other states’ laws are either clearly codified or explicitly
determined by case law,2 the law governing the right to float in Colorado is
comprised of a number of scattered and unclear precedents. The crux of the
problem is reconciling the Colorado Supreme Court’s holding in People v. Emmert3
with the state’s criminal trespass statute. In Emmert, the court held that “the public
has no right to the use of waters overlying private lands for recreational purposes
without the consent of the owner.”4 At the same time, Colorado’s criminal trespass
statute applies only to “real property, buildings, and . . . the stream banks and beds
of any nonnavigable fresh water streams flowing through such real property.”5
Right-to-float advocates argue that the legislative intent of the criminal trespass
statute was to allow the public to freely float on the state’s rivers,6 and property
rights advocates argue that the criminal trespass statute only decriminalized
floating but left the property owner with the right to exclude floaters through civil
actions.7
This Note examines the property rights that riparian landowners have as an
incident of property ownership and how these rights affect the public’s rights to

* J.D. candidate, 2014, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. Many thanks to
everyone who has supported and helped me.
1. See Cory Helton, Note, The Right to Float: The Need for the Colorado Legislature
to Clarify River Access Rights, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 868 n.195 (2012). See generally
Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines:
Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37
ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010) (describing public access throughout the West).
2. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-302 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-29-101 to -205
(West Supp. 2012); S. Idaho Fish & Game Ass’n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295,
1298 (Idaho 1974); State ex rel. State Game Comm’n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d
421, 430–31 (N.M. 1945); Parks v. Cooper, 2004 SD 22601, ¶ 47, 676 N.W.2d 823, 825;
Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 146–47 (Wyo. 1961). Like Colorado, Kansas has
proscribed recreational floating over private nonnavigable waters. See State ex rel. Meek v.
Hays, 785 P.2d 1356, 1365 (Kan. 1990).
3. 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979) (en banc).
4. Id. at 1030.
5. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-4-504.5 (West 2013).
6. E.g., Lori Potter, Steven Marlin & Kathy Kanda, Legal Underpinnings of the Right
to Float Through Private Property in Colorado: A Reply to John Hill, 5 U. DENV. WATER L.
REV. 457, 475–79 (2002).
7. E.g., John R. Hill, Jr., The “Right” to Float Through Private Property in Colorado:
Dispelling the Myth, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 331, 335 (2001); see also Memorandum
from Felicity Hannay, Deputy Attorney General, to Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Re:
Floating Access Issues (June 8, 1999) [hereinafter Hannay Memo] (describing the parties’
positions).
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fish and float in the state’s waters. This Note adopts a more moderate position than
previous commentators. While this Note agrees with right-to-float advocates that
public policy supports a right to float and that the legislature should act to protect
this right, it argues that right-to-float advocates have failed to fully appreciate
riparian landowners’ rights.
Part I briefly sketches out the nature of the conflict and why legislative action is
necessary. Part II examines the 1905 case Hartman v. Tresise8 and argues that
riparian owners of nonnavigable streams in Colorado have the exclusive right to
fish those streams. Part III examines the 1979 case People v. Emmert and argues
that riparian owners also have the right to exclude floaters through civil actions.
Parts IV and V examine how these compensable property rights affect a legislative
solution to the right-to-float problem. Part IV outlines the law of takings and argues
that a statute that grants the public the right to float would constitute a taking
subject to the constitutional requirement of just compensation. Finally, Part V
examines the amount of just compensation necessary if the legislature granted the
public a right to float and argues that the value attributable to a landowner’s
exclusive right to fish and right to exclude through civil actions is not sufficient to
deter the legislature from acting.
I. THE RIVER ACCESS CONFLICT
A. The Nature of the Conflict
The battle over the state’s waters is more than academic: it reflects deep class
divisions,9 a xenophobic-like hatred of out-of-staters,10 and the turmoil of a state

8. 84 P. 685 (Colo. 1905) (en banc).
9. Compare id. at 693 (Bailey, J., dissenting) (“That which belongs to the whole people
will be given to a few . . . who are enabled by reason of their wealth or other fortunate
condition to acquire by purchase, lease or otherwise, the right of fishery from the ranchmen
who live upon these streams. . . . The poor, to whom work is a necessity and recreation a
blessing, will be deprived of a constitutional right, so that the pleasure of the clubmen and
the landholders may be increased.”), with Editorial, Rafting Is Not a Basic Human Right,
COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE (Feb. 22, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.gazette.com/opinion/view
-94619-basic-human.html (“Politically, it’s a no-brainer to take from the few and give to the
many. The many can easily outvote the few, which rewards politicians for redistribution
policies. . . . [A statute protecting a public right to float] creates a direct subsidy to the rafting
industry at a cost in both money and privacy to those whose lives they disrupt when rafting
parties float through their land . . . . [The proposed statute] will trash the rights of private
property owners and cause some tremendous hardship for some.”).
10. See, e.g., Phillip Doe, Along Came a Texan . . . Stealing Rivers in Colorado,
COUNTERPUNCH (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.counterpunch.org/2010/04/29/stealing-rivers
-in-colorado/ (“Recently, another Texan came to Colorado to buy his piece of the state.”);
Matt C, Comment to Colorado’s Rafting Industry Hangs in Balance, DENVERPOST.COM
(Apr. 1, 2010, 5:48 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/willoughby/ci_14734881 (“Texas
developer = selfish, greedy problem.”); parkhillposse, Comment to Colorado’s Rafting
Industry Hangs in Balance, supra (Mar. 23, 2012, 1:38 PM) (“Texan developer. Two of the
worst words in the English language.”); slave W, Comment to Colorado’s Rafting Industry
Hangs in Balance, supra (Mar. 23, 2010, 9:10 AM) (“When it’s all said and done the Lewis
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undergoing a massive economic and cultural transition.11
Conflicts between floaters and landowners have occurred across the state. On
the South Platte River, an exclusive fishing club sought to prevent floaters from
floating through its two miles of property by building obstacles in the river, yelling
at boaters, shoveling dirt on boaters from a bridge, and seeking criminal trespassing
charges.12 On another stretch of the South Platte, landowners strung barbed wire
across the river to stop kayakers.13 On the Arkansas River—which is the busiest
recreational river in the country14 and had a rafting-related economic impact of
nearly fifty-two million dollars in 201215—traditional ranchers have started to use
their property for exclusive fishing and have become increasingly intolerant of
rafters.16 On the Lake Fork, a landowner filed a civil trespass suit seeking nominal
damages and a permanent injunction to keep a rafting company from floating
through his ranch.17 While the landowner expressed conservation concerns,18 he
was using the property as a private fishing retreat, and “[t]he handful of fly
fishermen who pay [the ranch] to spend about 40 days on the river bring in more
money than the ranch’s cows . . . and the boaters often scare the fish away.”19
Shaw’s of the world will wish they’d stayed in Texas . . . .”); Randaddy, Comment to HB
1188 Outfitter Bill Committee Hearing, MOUNTAINBUZZ.COM (Jan. 2, 2010, 8:19 PM), http://
www.mountainbuzz.com/forums/f11/hb-1188-outfitter-bill-committee-hearing-28731.html
(“And they are from Texas. Anyone want Texans to block navigable waterways?”).
11. The demographic of buyers in the West has shifted from traditional farm and ranch
buyers to recreational buyers, who “often displace prominent ranching families with multigenerational tenure on the land, with significant implications for community dynamics,
especially as they relate to the local management of natural resources.” Hannah Gosnell,
Julia H. Haggerty & Patrick A. Byorth, Ranch Ownership Change and New Approaches to
Water Resource Management in Southwestern Montana: Implications for Fisheries,
43 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS’N 990, 991 (2007). Compare slavetotheflyrod, Comment
to HB 1188 Outfitter Bill Committee Hearing, supra note 10 (Feb. 1, 2010, 8:52 AM),
(describing out-of-state landowners as “the [ones] that want to land their gulfstream at the
airstrip, have the porter ready their waders and rod while they have brandy and cigars at the
clubhouse, then head out to the river and catch the biggest possible fish with the least
possible effort, [after which] they’ll again retire to the clubhouse to congratulate themselves,
again over brandy and cigars”), with Deep Cut, MISSOULA INDEP. (June 17, 2009),
http://missoulanews.bigskypress.com/missoula/deep-cut/Content?oid=1150506 (describing
rock star Huey Lewis’s opinion of the “barbarity” of the Montana locals’ choice of worm
fishing).
12. Jason Robertson, River Access in Colorado Under Siege!, AM. WHITEWATER (Aug.
23, 2001), http://www.americanwhitewater.org/archive/article/195.
13. Shara Rutberg, Boaters Float for Their Rights, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Aug. 13,
2001, at 3.
14. Julie Cart, For Colo. Rafters, Troubled Waters; As Sport Grows More Popular,
Ranchers Are Claiming River Rights, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2001, at A7.
15. COLO. RIVER OUTFITTERS ASS’N, COMMERCIAL RIVER USE IN THE STATE OF
COLORADO: 1988–2011 (2012), available at http://croa.org/media/documents/pdf/2012
-commercial-rafting-use-report.pdf.
16. Cart, supra note 14.
17. See Rutberg, supra note 13.
18. Patrick O’Driscoll, Boating Rights Hit Choppy Waters, USA TODAY, July 26, 2001,
at 3A.
19. Rutberg, supra note 13; see also Lake Fork of the Gunnison River Information, U.S.
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Conflicts on the Taylor River have become commonplace. In one instance, a
group of eight boaters—including a district attorney—deliberately floated through
posted property, where they were confronted with a gun-wielding landowner, who
was later arrested for threatening the floaters.20 At Harmel’s Ranch Resort, a
private fishing retreat on the Taylor River that charges fishermen for exclusive
access to the river,21 the owners have invested considerable amounts of money to
improve the river and fishing habitat22 and are increasingly frustrated by the
floaters: “They’re splashing the water, going ‘whee!’ over the dams I created when
I improved the fishing. They’ve hit the bridge with paddles. . . . So here I am,
getting overrun with trespassers because trespassing is popular.”23 The floaters, on
the other hand, have asserted a right to float through the ranch: “[W]e need to be
rafting the middle section of the Taylor ROUTINELY this summer to perserve our
legal rights to raft. . . . I rafted the section through Harmels many years ago, despite
all the shouting and protests from the A-holes on the banks.”24
Downstream of Harmel’s is Wilder on the Taylor.25 Texas-based developer
Jackson-Shaw describes the property as twenty-six individual thirty-five-acre home
sites on a “2,000-acre shared ranch and recreation preserve.”26 The Taylor is the
ranch’s crown jewel: Jackson-Shaw spent two years restoring the section of river to
improve trout and insect habitat in the river27 to create a property that “is host to
nearly two miles of professionally enhanced, very exclusive, and extremely private
tailwater fishery.”28 In 2010, Jackson-Shaw threatened to sue local rafting
companies to keep them from floating through the property.29 The Colorado
General Assembly responded by introducing House Bill 10-1188, which clarified

DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., COLO. (Jan. 30, 2006), http://www
.blm.gov/co/st/en/fo/gfo/recreation_information/lakeforkinfo.html (“The landowners along
this stretch have had numerous problems with boaters and fishermen blatantly trespassing,
leaving trash, destroying property and verbally abusing them, their employees and their
guests.”).
20. Jason Robertson, Why ‘Access’?, AM. WHITEWATER (Apr. 26, 2001), http://www
.americanwhitewater.org/archive/article/175.
21. Nathaniel H. Amendola, Let My People Go Fishing: Applying the Law of “Givings”
to Private Fishing Preserves, Exclusive Fishing Rights, and State-Stocked Rivers, 62
SYRACUSE L. REV. 117, 122 (2012).
22. Jessica Fender, Rafters, Landowner Drift Apart on Taylor River: Legislation May
Have to Settle a Fight over Water Navigation Rights, DENVER POST, Jan. 31, 2010, at B01.
23. Id. (quoting Steve Roberts, operator of Harmel’s Ranch Resort).
24. gunnisonriver, Comment to Guide Arrested on Taylor River, Colorado,
MOUNTAINBUZZ.COM (Apr. 12, 2011, 8:26 AM), http://www.mountainbuzz.com/forums/f14
/guide-arrested-on-taylor-river-colorado-35633.html (spelling errors and emphasis in
original).
25. See Fender, supra note 22.
26. Real Estate Developer Jackson-Shaw Completes Taylor River Restoration Project,
BUS. WIRE (Nov. 17, 2009, 10:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home
/20091117005535/en/Real-Estate-Developer-Jackson-Shaw-Completes-Taylor-River.
27. Id.
28. RanchesForSale, Wilder on the Taylor, YOUTUBE (Dec. 6, 2012), https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=AKj06zxTH50.
29. Fender, supra note 22.
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river access and guaranteed the public a right to float through private property.30
The bill eventually failed when it was unclear whether or not the bill would
constitute an unconstitutional taking of private property without just
compensation.31
B. Legislative Solutions
This Note focuses on a legislative response to the right-to-float problem.
Starting with Emmert, the Colorado Supreme Court has refused to intrude on what
it believes is properly the role of the legislature. The Emmert majority noted that
“[i]f the increasing demand for recreational space on the waters of this state is to be
accommodated, the legislative process is the proper method to achieve this end”32
and that “it is within the competence of the General Assembly to modify rules of
common law within constitutional parameters.”33 Justice Carrigan’s dissent agreed,
noting that the right to float was best left to the legislature.34 Just last year, Justice
Hobbs noted that “Emmert is best read for the proposition that the Colorado
Constitution does not address the recreational use of water and that this subject is
properly a matter for legislative consideration.”35
The legislature is also the most competent branch in this regard. A court
decision that reversed Emmert would likely not resolve the issue: both property and
recreational interests are sufficiently strong to compel a legislative response to such
a court decision.36 Finally, a comprehensive legislative definition of a right to float
would shorten the years of litigation necessary for courts to determine the full
scope of the public’s right.37

30. See H.B. 10-1188, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2010); Helton, supra
note 1, at 850–51.
31. HB 10-1188 (Clarify River Outfitter Navigation Right) Dies in Conference
Committee, COYOTE GULCH (May 15, 2010), http://coyotegulch.wordpress.com/?s=%22hb
+10-1188%22; see also Helton, supra note 1, at 850–51.
32. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1029 (Colo. 1979) (en banc).
33. Id. at 1027; see also State ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1356, 1364–65 (Kan.
1990) (“Where the legislature refuses to create a public trust for recreational purposes in
nonnavigable streams, courts should not alter the legislature’s statement of public policy by
judicial legislation. If the nonnavigable waters of this state are to be appropriated for
recreational use, the legislative process is the proper method to achieve this goal.”).
34. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1033–34 (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
35. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Reviving the Public Ownership, Antispeculation, and
Beneficial Use Moorings of Prior Appropriation Water Law, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 97, 125
(2013).
36. For example, after the Utah Supreme Court expanded recreational access by
allowing floaters to touch the beds of privately owned streams, the Utah legislature
responded by curtailing that right and limiting the public’s access to floating. Jeremiah I.
Williamson, Stream Wars: The Constitutionality of the Utah Public Waters Access Act, 14 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 315, 322–23 (2011).
37. Cf. Charles B. White, To Float or Not to Float: Water Congress Can Help Find a
Solution, DENVER POST, Apr. 16, 2010, at B11 (describing the many variables and issues that
need to be resolved).
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Even though the legislature is the appropriate forum for changing the law, the
legislature is faced with the serious obstacle that granting a right to float may
constitute a taking of property without just compensation.38 Justice Carrigan
explained the problem while dissenting in Emmert:
Ironically the majority opinion, while implying that the General
Assembly is competent to change the rule adopted today, has
complicated the prospects of having the rule changed in the future. The
Court has painted the state into a corner, and its brushwork assures that
any effort to alter the rule will be difficult and expensive. The Court, by
creating a vested property right in stream water (with the concomitant
right to exclude all others from that water), has created a valuable
property interest. And the General Assembly, therefore, cannot give the
public recreational access to rivers without taking away from
landowners their newly recognized property interests and paying them
“just compensation.”39
Justice Carrigan’s predictions came true in 2010 when the General Assembly
failed to pass right-to-float legislation because of the fear that it would be an
unconstitutional taking40 after property rights advocates argued that the legislation
would ensure “[a] flood of lawsuits by landowners . . . [that] could result in tens or
hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation claims that would drain the state
treasury.”41
The failure of House Bill 10-1188 has left Colorado in the state of uncertainty
that has existed since Emmert, and the legislature will have to try again.42 In doing
so, the legislature must consider the full nature, extent, and value of the rights of
riparian owners.
II. THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO FISH
In Hartman v. Tresise,43 the Colorado Supreme Court held that a landowner who
owned the banks and bed of a nonnavigable stream had the exclusive right to the
fishery in the stream.44 In doing so, the Hartman court implicitly created the
foundational rules for limiting the public’s right to float in Colorado.45

38. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15.
39. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1033 (Carrigan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
40. See HB 10-1188 (Clarify River Outfitter Navigation Right) Dies in Conference
Committee, supra note 31.
41. Rafting Is Not a Basic Human Right, supra note 9.
42. See generally Helton, supra note 1 (arguing the legislature should revive the rightto-float debate).
43. 84 P. 685 (Colo. 1905) (en banc).
44. Id. at 687.
45. See People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027–28 (Colo. 1979) (en banc) (relying on
Hartman).
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A. Hartman v. Tresise
Alonzo Hartman was an important and wealthy figure in the early history of
Western Colorado who owned “one of the largest and most prosperous ranches” in
Western Colorado,46 which sat at the junction of the Gunnison River and Tomichi
Creek.47 Hartman’s land was fenced and posted, and Tomichi Creek had been
stocked with fish by the state.48 Hartman had warned Tresise not to trespass, but
Tresise ignored him and trespassed “to fish in such stream, which he succeeded in
doing.”49
The Gunnison District Court dismissed the action for trespass, holding as a
matter of law that Tresise had the constitutional and statutory right to fish in the
stream.50 Article XVI, section 5 of the Colorado Constitution provides that “[t]he
water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of
Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, and the same is
dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation as
hereinafter provided.”51 In 1903, the Colorado General Assembly passed a statute
providing “[t]hat the public shall have the right to fish in any stream in this state,
stocked at public expense, subject to actions in trespass for any damage done
property along the bank of any such stream.”52
The Colorado Supreme Court overruled the trial court and held that the state
constitution, which declares the water of the state “to be the property of the public,”
only confirmed a right of appropriation and did not give the public any other rights
to the water.53 Next, because Hartman owned the streambeds and the banks of the
creek, Hartman had the exclusive right to the fishery in the creek.54 The statute,
which gave the public the right to fish in any waters in the state, was thus

46. Judy Buffington Sammons, One Long Ride (Beginning on a Government Mule),
GUNNISON COUNTRY MAG., 2012, at 74, 76. Hartman built “the fanciest of the early ranch
houses in the area,” which “boasted a tower with ascending arched windows, a white oak
staircase, parquet floors, stained glass windows and fancy wood filigree everywhere.” Id.
Hartman seemed to be present at important events in the history of the area. He was
apparently the first person to talk to Alferd Packer when Packer rode into the Los Pinos
Agency and confessed to cannibalism. See Ed Quillen, Alferd Packer, the Colorado
Cannibal, COLO. CENT. MAG., Sept. 1995, available at http://cozine.com/1995-september
/alferd-packer-the-colorado-cannibal/. Cannibal Outdoors, the rafting company discussed
infra Part II, bears Packer’s namesake. In addition to being a rancher, Hartman was
Gunnison’s first postmaster. WILSON ROCKWELL, UNCOMPAHGRE COUNTRY 136 (1965). In
1911, Hartman and his brothers organized the Paradox Irrigation Land and Development
Company in Gunnison to develop Buckeye Reservoir in the West End, which brought in
more than $200,000 in outside investments and required some 250 laborers. Id.
47. Sammons, supra note 46, at 75–76.
48. Hartman, 84 P. at 686.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
52. 1903 Colo. Sess. Laws 233.
53. Hartman, 84 P. at 686.
54. Id. at 687.
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unconstitutional under the state’s takings clause.55 Alternatively, the court noted,
even if the public did have a right to fish in streams that crossed private property,
the statute would be an unconstitutional taking for granting an easement across
private lands to reach public water.56
The Hartman court’s decision was grounded in a long history of English
common law. Particularly, the court relied on two traditional rules: because the
creek was a nonnavigable stream, Hartman held title to the streambed; and, as
owner of both the streambed and the stream banks, Hartman held the exclusive
right to the fishery.57
1. Navigability Under Federal and State Law
At English common law, streams were divided into three classes: those streams
subject to the ebb and flow of the tides were navigable at law;58 those nontidal
streams that were capable of navigation were navigable in fact;59 and those streams
both nontidal and nonnavigable were private streams.60 Title to the streambed and
soil in navigable rivers was held by the Crown, and the public had the right of
passage and the right to fish.61 Title to the streambed in those nontidal, navigablein-fact waters was privately owned, so that the public maintained the right of
passage, but the owner of the streambed held the right to fish.62 In those streams
that were nontidal and nonnavigable, the landowner held the exclusive right of
passage and fishing.63
In the United States, the traditional tidal rule was difficult to apply: unlike
England, whose size and coastal geography meant that rivers that were navigable in
fact were substantially those that were influenced by the tides, the United States’
size and geography resulted in significant inland rivers that were navigable in fact
but were not influenced by tides.64 American courts thus rejected the distinction
between navigable at law and navigable in fact and applied navigability to those
rivers “used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as
highways for commerce”65 capable of forming “a continued highway over which
commerce is, or may be, carried on with other States or foreign countries.”66 This
federal test of navigability is used to determine the application of federal regulatory
authority, application of specific federal statutes, title to streambeds under the

55. Id. at 686–87.
56. Id. at 687 (citing COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15).
57. Id.
58. See PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1226–27 (2012).
59. Henry William McMillan, Note, Water and Watercourses—Public Right of Fishery
in Navigable Waters over Private Submerged Lands, 12 TEX. L. REV. 72, 74 (1933).
60. Id. at 74–75.
61. PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1226–27.
62. Id.
63. McMillan, supra note 59, at 75.
64. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870); see also PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct.
at 1227.
65. PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1228 (quoting The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563).
66. Id. at 1231–32.
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equal-footing doctrine, admiralty jurisdiction, and the breadth of the federal
commerce power.67
In addition to the federal test for navigability, states can adopt their own tests for
navigability.68 For those streams that do not meet the federal navigation standard,
the respective rights of the landowners and the public will be set by these state
laws.69
2. The Exclusive Right to Fish
The court in Hartman never explicitly weighed navigability, though it seemed to
assume that Tomichi Creek was nonnavigable,70 and the court simply applied the
traditional common law rule that a landowner who owns the streambed and the
banks has the exclusive right to the fishery.71
By the nineteenth century, in the years leading up to Hartman, it was wellsettled in England that the owner of the banks and the streambed held the exclusive
right to the fishery.72 The landowner who owned the streambed maintained the
exclusive right to fish, even if the river was navigable in fact.73 In America, some
courts allowed the public to fish in navigable-in-fact streams over private
streambeds,74 but the majority of courts continued to follow the traditional rule that
the landowner of a nonnavigable stream held the exclusive right to fish.75 Thus,
when Hartman was decided in 1905, there was a clear line of authority that

67. Id. at 1228–29.
68. Hill, supra note 7, at 342; see also infra Part IV.C.2. Indiana, for instance, has
adopted the traditional English rule that navigable-at-law rivers are those subject to the ebb
and flow of the tides and that navigable-in-fact rivers are those that meet the Daniel Ball test
for commercial navigability. Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern
Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16
PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 48 (2007).
69. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170 (Mont. 1984).
70. See Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 687 (Colo. 1905) (en banc).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Hudson v. MacRea, (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 579 (K.B.) 582; 4 B. & S. 584,
591–92 (upholding a criminal conviction for illegally fishing in a private, nonnavigable
river, “where the public could not possibly have a right of fishing”).
73. See, e.g., Hargreaves v. Diddams, (1875) 10 L.R. 582 (Q.B.) 585–86 (upholding a
criminal conviction for unlawfully fishing private water when a nonnavigable stream had
been rendered navigable in fact by significant improvements and Acts of Parliament); see
also Musset v. Burch, (1876) 35 L.T. 486 (Div. App.) 487 (“Can the right to navigate give
the right to fish? No case has been made out to satisfy the court that such is the law . . . .
[T]he other cases . . . are too strong to leave any doubt on the question.”).
74. See, e.g., Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 145 N.W. 816, 819 (Wis. 1914).
75. See, e.g., Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 500, 506 (1872); Albright v.
Cortright, 45 A. 634, 636 (N.J. 1900) (quoting Smith v. Andrews, (1891) 2 Ch. 678, 695–96
(Eng.)); Griffith v. Holman, 63 P. 239, 243 (Wash. 1900); see also JOHN M. GOULD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERS § 46 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1883). “Further citation
of authority and illustration that, when the plaintiff became the purchaser of the land and the
beds of the streams and ponds, he prima facie had the exclusive right of fishery therein, is
futile and unnecessary.” Rockefeller v. Lamora, 83 N.Y.S. 289, 293 (App. Div. 1903).
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supported the holding that Hartman alone had the exclusive right to fish in the
nonnavigable river that flowed through his property.76
Despite this traditional line of authority, Justice Gunter concurred specially, and
Justices Bailey and Steele dissented.77 Justice Gunter, agreeing that the 1903 statute
that granted the public a right to fish in any state-stocked waters78 was
unconstitutional because it granted the public an easement over private lands,
believed that the court should have decided the case on the much narrower ground
that Tresise had violated a game law that made it illegal to fish on private property
without consent.79
In a passionate dissent, Justice Bailey argued that article XVI, section 5 of the
Colorado Constitution granted the public title to the water until the water was
appropriated.80 Applying the English rule that the public has the right of navigation
and the right of fishing in public waters,81 Justice Bailey argued that the state
constitution itself protected the public’s right to float and fish in all waters that had
not been appropriated.82 Forty years later, the New Mexico Supreme Court agreed
with Justice Bailey, holding in State ex rel. State Game Commission v. Red River
Valley Co.83 that unappropriated waters belong to the public, so the owner of the
underlying streambed did not have any exclusive right of fishery or recreation
distinct from the general public.84
B. The Relevance of Hartman
Hartman was virtually unheard of for nearly seventy-five years before the
Colorado Supreme Court applied Hartman in People v. Emmert.85 While no
Colorado decision has overturned or questioned Hartman, neither has any decision
directly reaffirmed Hartman’s holding that the owner of the beds and banks of a
nonnavigable stream has the exclusive right of the fishery. The question is whether
a century-old case still has any relevance today. This Part argues that it does.
1. Hartman and Stare Decisis
Admittedly, Hartman is not the strongest case on which to define a right:
Hartman was based on an English rule “[that] evolved when clothing was made
from buckskin and surviving the winter depended upon capturing, killing, and
preserving enough wild fish and game”;86 the holding of Hartman is arguably all

76. See Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 687 (Colo. 1905) (en banc).
77. Id. at 687, 688.
78. See supra text accompanying note 52.
79. Hartman, 84 P. at 688 (Gunter, J., concurring specially).
80. Id. at 690–91 (Bailey, J., dissenting).
81. See supra text accompanying note 61.
82. Hartman, 84 P. at 690–91 (Bailey, J., dissenting).
83. 182 P.2d 421 (N.M. 1946).
84. Id. at 431, 434 (citing Hartman, 84 P. at 690 (Bailey, J., dissenting)).
85. See 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979) (en banc).
86. Robert W. Malmsheimer & Donald W. Floyd, Fishing Rights in Nontidal, Navigable
New York State Rivers: A Historical and Contemporary Perspective, 62 ALB. L. REV. 147,
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dicta;87 and neighboring New Mexico explicitly rejected Hartman. Still, none of
these reasons are sufficient to overturn Hartman today.
Colorado courts follow the doctrine of stare decisis and follow precedent
established in earlier cases88 “unless clearly convinced that the rule was originally
erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good
than harm will come from departing from precedent.”89
First, the rule announced in Hartman was not originally erroneous. While the
court could have decided Hartman on the narrower ground that Tresise had
trespassed across Hartman’s land to reach the creek,90 the court’s holding that
Hartman maintained the exclusive right of fishery in a nonnavigable stream91
simply applied the traditional majority rule that had existed for centuries, first in
England and later in the United States.92
The key inquiry in determining Hartman’s precedential value is whether the
Colorado Supreme Court correctly interpreted section 5 of article XVI to only
protect the right of appropriation.93 If, as Justice Bailey argued, the title to the water
belonged to the public, then the right of fishery would follow the title and inhere in
the public.94 While New Mexico and Wyoming have interpreted similar provisions
in their constitutions to protect a public recreational right,95 Colorado has
consistently “adhere[d] to a strong, state constitutionally based public water
ownership doctrine. This doctrine serves the public interest by allowing public and
private entities to appropriate water for beneficial use, subject to exercise of the
state’s police power in making those uses.”96 When the Colorado Supreme Court
had the opportunity to reexamine Hartman’s interpretation of the Colorado
Constitution in Emmert, the court directly affirmed Hartman and explicitly rejected
Wyoming’s competing interpretation of its own constitution.97 Colorado courts
have continued to apply this interpretation of the constitution98 and have continued
to affirm the various related holdings of Hartman.99
172 (1998).
87. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1031 (Groves, J., dissenting).
88. Bedor v. Johnson, 2013 CO 4, ¶ 23, 292 P.3d 924, 929 (en banc); see also People v.
Blehm, 983 P.2d 779, 788 (Colo. 1999) (en banc) (collecting cases).
89. Blehm, 983 P.2d at 788.
90. See Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 688 (Colo. 1905) (Gunter, J., concurring
specially).
91. See id. at 687.
92. See supra Part II.A.1.
93. See Hartman, 84 P. at 686.
94. See id. at 690–91 (Bailey, J., dissenting).
95. See State ex rel. State Game Comm’n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 430–
31 (N.M. 1945); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 146–47 (Wyo. 1961).
96. Hobbs, supra note 35, at 127–28.
97. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979) (en banc).
98. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of Park v. Park Cnty. Sportsmen’s Ranch, LLP,
45 P.3d 693, 710 (Colo. 2002) (en banc); Hobbs, supra note 35, at 124–25.
99. See Koch v. United States, 47 F.3d 1015, 1020–21 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying
Colorado law and holding that a riparian owner of a nonnavigable stream also owns the
streambed); Bergan Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. Barnes, 683 P.2d 365, 366–67 (Colo. App.
1984) (affirming the ad coelum doctrine); In re Confined Aquifer New Use Rules for Div. 3,
No. 2004 CW 24, 2006 WL 4037484, ¶¶ 487, 491, 505, 507 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Nov. 9, 2006);
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Second, Hartman has not been rendered erroneous by changing conditions. The
sheer number of fishing cases over the last few centuries across English and
American jurisdictions suggests that the public’s demand to fish is not a sufficient
factor to abrogate a landowner’s exclusive right to fish. Thus, even though the
demand for fishing access may be higher today than it was a century ago, Hartman
was not decided in an era devoid of conflicts between public fishers and private
landowners. Indeed, the conflict in Hartman grew directly out of a statutory
attempt to solve the conflict. Furthermore, the rule announced in Hartman is
perhaps even more relevant today as landowners purchase properties as fishing
retreats or invest money in improving the fishery in order to increase their
property’s value.100
2. The Right to Fish as an Incident of Navigation
If Hartman is still good law, then a statute that grants the public a right to float
must address a landowner’s exclusive right to fish—that is, the legislature must
address whether a public right to fish is an incident of navigation.
States have split on whether the right to fish is incidental to the right to float,101
but those states that have held that the public has the right to fish have tied that
right to the public trust doctrine,102 which Colorado has rejected.103
The Wyoming Supreme Court recognized the conflict inherent in protecting
landowners and granting a right to fish but decided that a right to fish was inherent
and incidental in the right to float in Day v. Armstrong.104 Within a couple of
paragraphs, the court held both that “in using the State’s waters for floating, the
public is not privileged, except as incidental to such use, to violate other property
rights of riparian owners”105 but that “[i]t is also the right of the public while so
lawfully floating in the State’s waters to lawfully hunt or fish or do any and all
other things which are not otherwise made unlawful.”106
On the other hand, a recent case in New York applied the traditional common
law rule that the owner of the streambed maintains the exclusive right to fish, even
if the stream is navigable in fact. In Douglaston Manor, Inc. v. Bahrakis,107 the
New York Court of Appeals held that a public right to fish was not incidental to a

Gateview Ranch, Inc. v. Cannibal Outdoor Network, Inc., No. 01CV52 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec.
5, 2001) (order on cross motions for a determination of question of law).
100. Cf. Ben Pierce, Making Land Investments Pay, LIVE WATER PROPS. (Dec. 2011),
http://www.livewaterproperties.com/PDFS/2011/DecNewsletter2.pdf.
101. Compare Schulte v. Warren, 75 N.E. 783, 787 (Ill. 1905) (holding that plaintiff
landowner was entitled to an injunction because the right to hunt and fish was not incidental
to the right of navigation), with Willow River Club v. Wade, 76 N.W. 273, 276–77 (Wis.
1898) (holding that the right to fish was an incident of navigation, so the owner of the
streambed did not have the exclusive right to fish in a river that was navigable in fact).
102. See, e.g., Kerley v. Wolfe, 84 N.W.2d 748, 752 (Mich. 1957); Mont. Coal. for
Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984).
103. See People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979) (en banc).
104. 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
105. Id. at 146.
106. Id. at 147.
107. 678 N.E.2d 201 (N.Y. 1997).
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public right to float.108 Douglaston Manor is instructive because it involves many
of the same elements at play in Colorado fishing disputes.109 In that case,
Douglaston Manor owned the banks, bed, and river islands of a one mile stretch of
the Salmon River,110 one of the premier fisheries in the Great Lakes region.111
Douglaston Manor managed their section of the river as a private fishery, charging
for access while providing security, constructing support facilities for paying
anglers, and paying taxes on the property and riverbed.112 Though Douglaston
Manor owned the riverbed, the Salmon River is navigable in fact under New York
law, and the public has the right to float through the private property.113
Commercial fishing guides launched their boats at public access points and floated
into the private property to fish it.114 Though the guides anchored and waded,115
there is no indication that the wading affected the court’s decision.116
Relying on New York precedent, the court upheld the traditional doctrine that
the owner of the streambed had the exclusive right to fish, even if the public had
the right to float the river, for “[t]he easement of passage over navigable waters
does not involve a surrender of other privileges which are capable of enjoyment
without interference with the navigator.”117
The Douglaston Manor rule is a closer statement of the law as it should apply in
Colorado than Day. Like New York, Colorado has considered the right to fish and
the right to float as two independent property rights. Furthermore, those cases that
held that fishing was an incident to navigation misapplied the common law
tradition, which clearly recognized and separated the two independent property
rights by granting the public the right to fish in navigable streams but granting the
landowner the exclusive right to fish in nontidal, navigable-in-fact streams.118
Collapsing the two property rights would thus be inconsistent with the common law
tradition on which Colorado has relied.119 Moreover, since Colorado has rejected
the public trust doctrine regarding water in Colorado,120 those cases that hold that
the right of fishing is vested in the public are not persuasive.121 Finally, like the
owners of Douglaston Manor, the landowners who would most want to protect an

108. Id. at 204.
109. See generally Amendola, supra note 21, at 118–23 (comparing the Douglaston
Salmon Run on the Salmon River in New York to Harmel’s Ranch Resort on the Taylor
River in Colorado).
110. Douglaston Manor, 678 N.E.2d at 202.
111. See BOB LINSENMAN, BEST STREAMS FOR GREAT LAKES STEELHEAD 248–51 (2005);
MATT SUPINSKI, STEELHEAD DREAMS 124 (2001).
112. Douglaston Manor, 678 N.E.2d at 202.
113. Id. at 203–04.
114. Id. at 202.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 201–05.
117. Id. at 204 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Smith v. Odell, 137 N.E. 325, 327 (N.Y.
1922)).
118. See McMillan, supra note 59, at 75.
119. See generally Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685 (Colo. 1905) (en banc).
120. See infra text accompanying notes 244–247.
121. Cf. Kerley v. Wolfe, 84 N.W.2d 748, 752 (Mich. 1957); Mont. Coal. for Stream
Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984).
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exclusive right to fish are those who have expended significant amounts of money
in improving the streambed, the fish habitat, and the access for anglers.122
3. The Effect of an Exclusive Right to Fish
The effect of an exclusive right to fish presents additional problems. If, as
argued above, Hartman is still good law, then landowners have an independent
argument against those floaters who float and fish through their property. This
argument would not stop floaters who were not fishing, but it could be effective
against commercial fishing guides, especially on rivers that see more fishing traffic
than whitewater traffic. Further, if Hartman is still good law, then it would not be
diminished by a new legislatively created right to float.
Some commentators have argued that the right to fish should be an incident of
navigation because a contrary rule would be too burdensome on fishermen: A
landowner’s exclusive right to fish will “require[] anglers to learn and locate
property lines on all navigable streams where they fish . . . . [T]he duties
imposed . . . are archaic for anglers fishing from drifting or trolling boats.”123 While
it is unclear why a common law tradition developed for anglers fishing from
drifting boats is now archaic for modern anglers fishing from drifting boats, the
argument is unpersuasive. Even though floating anglers would have to obtain
permission from a landowner, landowners could easily post private property signs
that notify boaters that they had entered private property and thus could not fish
until they reached public land again.124 The real problem is not the burden on
anglers but whether anglers would actually follow the posted signs. Because
landowner enforcement would be difficult, anglers would have little incentive to
follow posted signs, thus raising the possibility of more direct river conflicts.
The number of rules developed by the common law reflect the diverse problems
between fishermen and landowners and stand as a cautionary example of why the
legislature should address both the right to fish and the right to float together.125
Because of the inherent enforceability problems of a landowner’s right to fish and
the likelihood that distinguishing between two property rights would only escalate
river conflicts, the legislature should view the right to fish as a compensable
property right and address it directly in crafting right-to-float legislation.

122. See supra Part I.A.
123. Malmsheimer & Floyd, supra note 86, at 178.
124. Cf. GOVERNOR’S RIVER ACCESS DISPUTE RESOLUTION TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT
6–7 (2010) [hereinafter GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE] (describing signs that notify boaters of
private land).
125. For example, based only on the traditional common law, a landowner has the right
to enforce the exclusive right to fish, but the landowner cannot do anything that interferes
with navigation. See GOULD, supra note 75, § 186 (describing the various common law rules
of navigation and fishing).
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III. THE RIGHT TO FLOAT
A. People v. Emmert
The right-to-float conflict in Colorado centers on the 1979 case People v.
Emmert.126 There, the defendants were convicted of third-degree criminal trespass
for floating and fishing through private ranch property on the Colorado River.127
The parties stipulated that the Colorado River was nonnavigable.128 The defendants
floated in rafts with leg holes that allowed them to touch the streambed and control
the rafts with their feet, and they touched the streambed as they crossed the private
ranch land.129 Right-to-float proponents have described the facts as “three
fisher[men], attempting to escape the workaday world in a time honored
fashion,”130 but Emmert was a lawyer131 who trespassed “for the express purpose of
testing whether the criminal trespass statute covered floating across private
property.”132
The defendants were convicted under the criminal trespass statute that applied if
“[one] unlawfully enters or remains in or upon premises.”133 At the time of the
conviction, the scope of “premises” was unclear.134 To analyze the trespass, the
Colorado Supreme Court applied the doctrine adopted in Hartman that the
streambeds of nonnavigable streams are the property of the owner of the adjacent
land.135 Next, the court applied the classic common law doctrine of cujus est solum,

126. 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979) (en banc).
127. Id. at 1026.
128. Id.; see also infra Part IV.C.2 (describing how the Colorado Supreme Court has
interpreted navigability in Colorado).
129. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1026.
130. Doe, supra note 10. This language mirrors Justice Bailey’s dissenting argument in
Hartman. See supra note 9.
131. Water Law, AMICUS, Spring 2010, at 3, 10.
132. Hannay Memo, supra note 7, at 2.
133. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1026 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-504 (1973)).
134. See Helton, supra note 1, at 856.
135. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1027 (citing More v. Johnson, 568 P.2d 437 (Colo. 1977) (en
banc); Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685 (Colo. 1905) (en banc); Hanlon v. Hobson, 51 P. 433
(Colo. 1897)). Some commentators predicted that Hartman would control the issue of
recreational access years before Emmert was decided. See G.E. RADOSEVICH, K.C. NOBE, D.
ALLARDICE & C. KIRKWOOD, EVOLUTION & ADMINISTRATION OF COLORADO WATER LAW:
1876–1976, at 209–10 (1976) (“The views expressed by Justice Bailey would no doubt
appeal to the hearts of many sportsmen today. But, as the Colorado law now stands, the
public has no right to fish or enter the lands of another in search of recreation or leisure. As
the court stated, ‘the public has no easement over any portion of private property, for the
purpose of reaching the streams.’ A 1973 legislative declaration bears on this question
indirectly. The Colorado Water Conservation Board is now vested with the authority, on
behalf of the people of the State of Colorado, to appropriate or acquire such waters of natural
streams and lakes as may be required to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable
degree. It should be clear that, if the appropriation is on behalf of the people, they should
certainly be entitled to use it. However, the legislature or the courts must remove the
constraint of the Hartman case.” (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original)).
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ejus est usque ad coelum (“he who owns the surface of the ground has the exclusive
right to everything which is above it”).136 The majority noted that the ad coelum
doctrine was “implicitly adopted by the court in Hartman” 137 and is also defined by
statute.138 With these prior precedents, the court held that “the ownership of the bed
of a non-navigable stream vests in the owner the exclusive right of control of
everything above the stream bed, subject only to constitutional and statutory
limitations, restrictions and regulations.”139
The Colorado Supreme Court explicitly rejected other states’ laws and
constitutions, a public easement for recreation as an incident of navigation, and the
public trust doctrine.140 The court acknowledged that other states had ruled
differently, but “consider[ed] the common law rule of more force and effect,
especially given its long-standing recognition in this state.” 141 Further, the court
noted that the constitutional provision did not apply because the provision is a
section on “Irrigation” in an article entitled “Mining and Irrigation.”142 The court
approved of Hartman and explicitly “reaffirm[ed] . . . that section 5, Article XVI of
the Colorado Constitution was primarily intended to preserve the historical
appropriation system of water rights upon which the irrigation economy in
Colorado was founded, rather than to assure public access to waters for purposes
other than appropriation.”143 Although the Wyoming Supreme Court had found a
right to public access in a similarly worded constitutional provision in Day v.
Armstrong,144 the Emmert court distinguished Day because the Wyoming
Constitution was a stronger statement of the public’s right to use the water, but
Colorado’s constitution only protected the right of appropriation.145
B. The Right to Float After Emmert
While Emmert was on appeal, the Colorado General Assembly passed section
18-4-504.5, which provides that for purposes of the criminal trespass statute,
“‘premises’ means real property, buildings, and other improvements thereon, and
the stream banks and beds of any nonnavigable fresh water streams flowing
through such real property.”146 The statute, which excludes the water itself,147

136. Id. at 1027; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159(1) (“[A] trespass may
be committed on, beneath, or above the surface of the earth.”). For early citations, see Bury
v. Pope, (1587) 78 Eng. Rep. 375; 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *18.
137. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1027.
138. COLO. REV. STAT. § 41-1-107 (West 2004) (“The ownership of space above the lands
and waters of this state is declared to be vested in the several owners of the surface beneath,
subject to the right of flight of aircraft.”).
139. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1027.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1028.
143. Id.
144. See 362 P.2d 137, 146–47 (Wyo. 1961).
145. See Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1028 & n.2.
146. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-4-504.5 (West 1977).
147. “Every river consists of: (1) the bed; (2) the water; (3) the banks or shores; and it
also has a current.” GOULD, supra note 75, § 41 (footnote omitted).
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seems to suggest that floating through private property is no longer a trespass, but
Emmert held explicitly that a floater could not float through private property
without permission. The Emmert court believed that section 18-4-504.5 had
“clarified the meaning of the word ‘premises,’”148 but the court gave no further
analysis of how its decision was consistent with the statute for future cases.149
In 1983, Attorney General Woodard released an opinion on the effect of section
18-4-504.5 and Emmert.150 The Woodard AGO concluded that floaters who cross
private property without touching the streambed or banks are not guilty of criminal
trespass and that landowners were not authorized to prohibit floaters from passing
through their land.151 The opinion was limited to discussing criminal trespass
because section 18-4-504.5 is a criminal trespass statute.152
Since Emmert, no appellate court has determined how Emmert and section
18-4-504.5 relate, 153 and no appellate court has ruled on whether a floater can be a
civil trespasser.154 In 2001, the Gunnison District Court155 ruled as a matter of law
that section 18-4-504.5 did not preclude civil liability because the statute clearly
and unambiguously provided only that the streambed and banks are part of the
premises for purposes of the criminal trespass statute.156 Thus, floaters who did not
touch the streambed or banks could not be convicted for criminal trespassing but
could be enjoined or held liable for civil damages. Furthermore, since the statute
was unambiguous in content and scope, the court could not reach the question of
legislative history for the purposes of statutory interpretation.157 The district court’s
plain reading of the statute is the most in-depth judicial explication of Emmert and

148. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1029.
149. See id. at 1029–30.
150. See Purpose and Effect of C.R.S. 1973, 18-4-504.5 (1978 repl. vol. 8), Colo. Op.
Att’y Gen., No. ONR8303024/KW, 1 (1983) [hereinafter Woodard AGO].
151. Id.
152. See id. at 1–2. Like the Woodard AGO, the Hannay Memo was limited to the
question of criminal trespass, noting that there is no authority on whether floaters can be held
liable for civil trespass. Hannay Memo, supra note 7, at 3, 5.
153. Hannay Memo, supra note 7, at 3.
154. Id. at app. A.
155. It should not have been surprising that another floating issue came before the
Gunnison court: the Hannay Memo was written partly in response to requests from the
Gunnison County Sherriff’s Department and the District Attorney for the Seventh Judicial
District. See id. at 1.
156. See Gateview Ranch, Inc. v. Cannibal Outdoor Network, Inc., No. 01CV52, at 5–7
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 5, 2001) (order on cross motions for a determination of question of
law).
157. Id. at 6. The rafting business was forced to close. Years later, the Colorado Springs
Gazette published an editorial in opposition to Colorado House Bill 10-1188 that seemed to
applaud that the rafting company had been shut down. See Rafting Is Not a Basic Human
Right, supra note 9 (“The last vestige of legal protection landowners have to protect their
property rights are civil trespass laws. That’s what commercial outfitters fear. In at least one
case, a commercial outfitter guiding trips through private lands was put out of business by
the District Court, which ruled in obedience to the state Supreme Court. The purpose of this
bill is to remove the right of landowners to seek civil redress of grievances and leave
commercial outfitters immune from any legal restraints.”).
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remains the most convincing argument that a landowner maintains the civil right to
exclude floaters.
C. The Right to Exclude
The Emmert majority’s reliance on the ad coelum doctrine was criticized at the
time by Justice Carrigan in dissent158 and has been criticized by subsequent
commentators.159 This criticism is compelling. The maxim is the better part of eight
hundred years old160 and “of such antiquity that [it must be] . . . express[ed] . . . in
Latin.”161 As long ago as 1946, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v.
Causby162 declared that the “doctrine has no place in the modern world,”163 and “[a]
long ‘leap of faith’ would be necessary to assume that ancient rule had been
imported into Colorado’s early common law.”164 The doctrine has been “explicitly
invalidat[ed] . . . in federal law”165 and “is outdated and is not a reliable basis for
justifying compensation.”166 Consequently, “Colorado should no longer be
restricted by the dead hand of history.”167
But whatever the rhetorical force of these arguments, they are not convincing as
a matter of history, law, or policy.168 The ad coelum rule was never applied
literally169 and was never assumed to mean “more than a right of control to the
height man could exert control.”170 The ad coelum doctrine was only meant
“merely as a statement of a landowner’s right of freedom from interference in the
use and enjoyment of his land.”171 This is why the Causby Court recognized that

158. See People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1032–34 (Colo. 1979) (Carrigan, J.,
dissenting).
159. See Travis H. Burns, Comment, Floating on Uncharted Headwaters: A Look at the
Laws Governing Recreational Access on Waters of the Intermountain West, 5 WYO. L. REV.
561, 590, 593–94 (2005); Richard Gast, People v. Emmert: A Step Backward for
Recreational Water Use in Colorado, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 247, 249–50 (1981); Helton,
supra note 1, at 851; Lisa LaBelle Scott, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine—A Tool for
Expanding Recreational Rafting Rights in Colorado, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 625, 627 (1986).
160. See Clement L. Bouvé, Private Ownership of Airspace, 1 AIR L. REV. 232, 247
(1930).
161. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1032 (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
162. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
163. Id. at 261.
164. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1032 (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
165. Burns, supra note 159, at 593 (citing Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972)).
166. Helton, supra note 1, at 871.
167. Id.
168. “Or it may be because the frequent admonitions of the courts against a literal
acceptation of the maxim, voiced in the act of applying it to a given situation, have remained
lost to the sight of those who have succumbed to the magic of the phrase.” Bouvé, supra
note 160, at 238.
169. See id. at 249–50.
170. State ex rel. State Game Comm’n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 452 (N.M.
1945) (Sadler, J., dissenting); see also Bouvé, supra note 160, at 254 (“Ownership is
founded upon occupancy and the capacity to occupy.”).
171. Howard H. Hackley, Trespassers in the Sky, 21 MINN. L. REV. 773, 777 (1937).
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the ad coelum doctrine was unworkable for the overflight cases but was still a
necessary element for other property rights: “[I]t is obvious that if the landowner is
to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate
reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. Otherwise buildings could not be erected,
trees could not be planted, and even fences could not be run.”172 Thus, the rule that
the Emmert court applied was not “a doctrine which the United States Supreme
Court long ago abandoned as obsolete”;173 the court’s citation of section 41-1-107
shows that the court was never applying a literal interpretation of ad coelum.174
Thus, Emmert’s citation of the ad coelum doctrine is unfortunate not for its legal
grounding but for the historically loaded language of the maxim itself.175 Modern
courts continue to decide cases by applying some variation of the ad coelum rule,176
and, “[i]n the decades since Causby, courts’ frequent recognition of private airspace
rights in the context of view easements, condominium laws, and solar access
easements has left little doubt that rights in non-navigable airspace are a legitimate

172. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264–65 (1946).
173. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1033 (Colo. 1979) (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 1027. It should be noted, additionally, that it has only been in the aircraft cases
that the upward ownership of air space has been questioned. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 159 cmt. g (1965). The aircraft cases are distinguishable from those involving the
ordinary airspace above a landowner’s property: air travel is necessary for the public good,
id., and national defense, Bouvé, supra note 160, at 238; the burden of negotiated
settlements in establishing transcontinental flights is too great, RICHARD EPSTEIN, TORTS
§ 1.10.3 (1999); landowners have never actually possessed the upper air space, so it makes
sense to prevent the landowner from excluding airlines from space that the landowner could
never use, id.; and a landowner has been amply compensated for the loss of a right to
exclude by the vast benefits of commercial air travel, id. These considerations are not nearly
as persuasive in the case of landowners in nonaircraft cases. But see Scott, supra note 159, at
627 (“In 1946, the United States Supreme Court held that the ancient doctrine of ownership
of land extending to the periphery of the universe has no place in the modern world.
Although the Court was referring to public use of the air space, the same reasoning applies to
public use of free running waters, especially in light of the increased importance of water
recreation states like Colorado.”(footnote omitted)). While public use of free running waters
has increased in importance, it is not obvious why the reasoning behind the aircraft cases
applies to rivers. If anything, the river cases are more analogous to the low-flying airplane
cases, where courts consistently award compensation. See infra notes 176–80 and
accompanying text. And, with the ever-growing importance of private fishing properties, see
supra Part I.A, the analogy to the low-flying airplane cases is even more apt, cf. Gast, supra
note 159, at 251 n.18 (noting that floaters would more substantially interfere with the
enjoyment of fishing properties than other properties).
175.
An Irish lawyer named Sullivan once argued an air rights case before the
highest court of Great Britain. A member of the court asked during oral
argument: “Mr. Sullivan, have your clients not heard of the maxim, cujus est
solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos?” Sullivan responded: “My lords,
the peasants of Northern Ireland speak of little else.”
Steel Creek Dev. Corp. v. James, 294 S.E.2d 23, 27 n.2 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
176. See, e.g., Smith v. Mun. Ct., 245 Cal. Rptr. 300, 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Orr v.
Mortvedt, 735 N.W.2d 610, 616–17 (Iowa 2008); Steel Creek, 294 S.E.2d at 27; Brenner v.
New Richmond Reg’l Airport Comm’n, 816 N.W.2d 291, 304 (Wis. 2012).
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form of property and that sub-adjacent landowners inherently possess those
rights.”177 Colorado courts have continued to differentiate the property interests
above and below navigable air space and have recognized property rights and
takings claims in that space above a landowner’s property and below the navigable
airspace.178 A legislative body may limit the landowner’s use of this space, but a
restriction may constitute a taking.179 Finally, the existence of easements does not
render the ad coelum doctrine obsolete as a whole. In those cases where an
easement exists, the landowner maintains the right to exclude, qualified by the
easement.180 Thus, Kansas followed the Emmert rule without relying on the ad
coelum doctrine: “Owners of the bed of a nonnavigable stream have the exclusive
right of control of everything above the stream bed, subject only to constitutional
and statutory limitations, restrictions, and regulations.”181
Whatever the baggage of the ad coelum maxim, its essence is still applicable:
the compensable property at stake in establishing a public right to float is the
landowner’s right to exclude others, “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle
of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”182
IV. TAKINGS
A. The Law of Takings
Takings law consists of a two-tiered analysis.183 At the outset, a plaintiff
property owner can establish a per se taking if the landowner can prove that the
regulation results in any “permanent physical occupation of real property”184 or
deprives the landowner of all economically beneficial or productive use of the

177. Troy A. Rule, Airspace and the Takings Clause, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 421, 428
(2012) (footnotes omitted).
178. See Claassen v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 30 P.3d 710, 713 (Colo. App. 2000);
Thompson v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 958 P.2d 525, 528 (Colo. App. 1998).
179. Cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 129–30 (1978)
(regulation that limited the height of new construction was not a taking).
180. Bergen Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. Barnes, 683 P.2d 365, 366–67 (Colo. Ct. App.
1984). One commentator has argued that “the [ad coelum] doctrine seems to have been made
obsolete with . . . Kaiser Aetna” because “the opinion implied that the ad coelum concept is
invalid for the purpose of determining navigability in U.S. jurisdictions.” Burns, supra note
159, at 594. The explanation suggested by Bergen is more convincing: private property
owners can exclude trespassers to the extent that there is not an easement that burdens the
property. Bergen, 683 P.2d 365. The federal navigation servitude is one such easement and
has always burdened property where it applies, but the imposition of that easement where it
had never existed before constituted a taking that required just compensation.
181. State ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1356, 1364 (Kan. 1990).
182. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
183. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617–18 (2001); Animas Valley
Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of La Plata, 38 P.3d 59, 61 (Colo.
2001) (en banc) (citing Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606).
184. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982)).
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property.185 If the plaintiff fails to meet one of these per se tests, the plaintiff is still
entitled to a fact-specific inquiry to determine if a taking has occurred.186
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that even a de minimis physical
invasion constitutes a per se taking, so that a “permanent physical occupation
authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it
may serve.”187 A government action constitutes a “permanent physical occupation”
when “individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so
that the real property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular
individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises.”188 For
these permanent physical occupations, compensation is required “no matter how
minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it.”189
For example, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,190 the Court held that a public right
of access over water that had traditionally been considered private constituted a
taking because this public right of access violated the landowner’s right to
exclude.191
While a violation of the right to exclude constitutes a per se taking, a takings
analysis of other property rights must consider the relation of these rights to the
property as a whole.192 Thus, in a takings analysis, individual property rights such
as mineral rights, airspace rights, or hunting rights are not separable from the
property as a whole but must be considered together with all the other rights that
the landowner retains.193 For example, in Clajon Production Corp. v. Petera,194 the
Tenth Circuit rejected the landowners’ claim that a hunting license requirement was

185. Id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)).
186. Id. at 617–18; Animas Valley, 38 P.3d at 61 (citing Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606). The
relevant factors in a fact-specific inquiry are the economic impact of the regulation of the
landowner, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-based
expectations, and the character of the government action. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617. For a plaintiff to
be entitled to use the fact-based inquiry, the plaintiff must fall within the category of
landowners whose land has effectively been taken but whose property retains a value slightly
more than de minimis. Animas Valley, 38 P.3d at 67.
187. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
188. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 832 (1987).
189. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
190. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
191. Id. at 179–80 (“[W]e hold that the ‘right to exclude,’ so universally held to be a
fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the
Government cannot take without compensation. This is not a case in which the Government
is exercising its regulatory power in a manner that will cause an insubstantial devaluation of
petitioners’ private property; rather, the imposition of the navigational servitude in this
context will result in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina.”) (citations
omitted); see also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836–37.
192. Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of La Plata,
38 P.3d 59, 67–68 (Colo. 2001) (en banc).
193. Id. at 68 (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978); Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d
1566, 1577 (10th Cir. 1995)).
194. 70 F.3d 1566 (10th Cir. 1995).
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a taking of the landowners’ common law property right to hunt on their property
because “the relevant denominator must be derived from the entire bundle of rights
associated with the parcel of land”195 rather than the separate right to hunt. The
court then rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that a taking had ever occurred, for the
regulation did not destroy the plaintiffs’ use of the property as a whole because the
plaintiffs “still c[ould] ‘use their property for ranching, farming, and other livestock
operations.’”196
B. Taking the Right to Exclude and the Right to Fish
The preceding discussion shows that a landowner could likely prove that
granting the public a right to float would constitute a per se taking. As the Court
noted in Loretto, “The one incontestable case for compensation (short of formal
expropriation) seems to occur when the government deliberately brings it about that
its agents, or the public at large, ‘regularly’ use, or ‘permanently’ occupy, space or
a thing which theretofore was understood to be under private ownership.”197
Kaiser Aetna and Nollan are particularly instructive. As Kaiser Aetna suggests,
granting a right to float would burden historically private waters with a public right
of access. This private burden is substantially similar to Nollan, where the
landowners were required to grant an easement for the public to connect public
beaches. While the specific issue in Nollan was whether the building permit could
be conditioned on granting of the easement, the Court noted that had the state
imposed the easement by itself “to the public on a permanent basis in order to
increase public access to the beach, . . . we have no doubt there would have been a
taking.”198
Furthermore, courts have not had to rely on the ad coelum doctrine in finding
that a legislative declaration of navigability constitutes a taking.199 The deciding
factor in these cases is whether the stream is navigable under state law. Some of
these states have adopted broad definitions of navigability that would include many
of Colorado’s rivers,200 and other states have persuasively included recreational use
to determine navigability.201 Still, Colorado’s adherence to a narrow definition of
commercial navigability and insistence that there are no navigable rivers within the
state202 make a legislative right to float fall within the traditional rule that a statute

195. Id. at 1577 (citations omitted).
196. Id. (quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
197. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 n.5 (1982)
(quoting Frank L. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1184 (1967)).
198. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
199. See United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 322 (1917) (collecting cases); Morgan v.
King, 35 N.Y. 454, 461 (1866); Miller v. State, 137 S.W. 760, 761 (Tenn. 1911) (collecting
cases); Comment, Right of States to Declare Non-Navigable Rivers Navigable, 19 YALE L.J.
654 (1910).
200. See, e.g., Morgan, 35 N.Y. at 458–59; Miller, 137 S.W. at 762.
201. See, e.g., Adirondack League Club, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 706 N.E.2d 1192, 1194–96
(N.Y. 1998).
202. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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that grants public access to a nonnavigable stream is a taking that requires just
compensation.
On the other hand, a landowner would be unable to prove that legislation that
granted a public right to fish amounts to a per se taking, for the regulation would
not amount to a permanent physical occupation and would not completely devalue
the landowner’s property.
The landowner that fails the per se test is still entitled to prove that there has
been a taking if the property’s value is slightly above de minimis but has
sufficiently depreciated to constitute a taking.203 This will be a difficult burden for a
plaintiff landowner. While the right to fish has always been considered a valuable
property right204 that cannot be taken without just compensation,205 the right to fish
is a right incidental to property ownership, so the landowner must prove that the
taking of the right to fish devalued the property as a whole. Like the right to hunt in
Clajon,206 the right to fish is merely a single stick in the larger bundle of rights.207
Clajon showed how difficult it is for a landowner to prove that the loss or
restriction of an incidental right amounts to a taking: even though the court
acknowledged that the right had been restricted, the court held that there had not
been a taking because the value of the ranch as a whole had not diminished and the
ranch could be used for other purposes.208 Finally, even if a property owner could
prove that the property had become substantially devalued by granting a public
right to fish, the landowner would be subjected to the complex, fact-intensive
inquiry of Penn Station.209 While some landowners could likely prove that the
regulation interfered with their investment-based expectations,210 the nature of the
regulation would be reasonable.211
Consequently, a statute that grants the public a right to float through private
property would constitute a taking of private property, but it would likely be
impossible for a landowner to prove that a grant to the public of a right to fish

203. See supra Part II.A.
204. See GOULD, supra note 75, §§ 182–84.
205. See, e.g., State ex rel. State Game Comm’n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421,
454–55 (N.M. 1945) (Sadler, J., dissenting) (“The wild berries growing upon my land are
exclusively mine, and merely because they are wild no stranger has the right to trespass and
pick them. The exclusive right of fishery in non-navigable streams is just as sacred as an
owner’s exclusive right to pick wild fruit and berries upon his own land. When, by virtue of
public ownership of waters flowing in natural streams, we take away from an owner through
which a non-navigable stream flows rights in such waters appurtenant to ownership of the
land and unessential to the attainment by the state of the dominant purposes underlying the
constitutional declaration that such waters belong to the public, then, in truth and reality are
we violating the constitutional inhibition against the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation.”).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 196–98.
207. James L. Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause Through the Myth of Public Rights:
The Public Trust and Reserved Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 171,
187–88 (1987).
208. Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1577 (10th Cir. 1995).
209. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
210. See supra Part I.A.
211. See supra note 201.
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while floating through private property sufficiently devalued the property to
constitute a taking.
C. Background Principles as a Takings Defense
Lucas held that a regulation that destroys all economic value of a property is
categorically a taking unless the government can prove that the new regulation was
consistent with the background principles of the state’s property and nuisance law
that inhered in the title itself.212 While the categorical taking in Lucas only applies
to those situations in which a regulation destroys all economic value of the
property,213 the use of the background principles defense applies to physical
occupation and Penn Central cases in which total economic deprivation has not
occurred.214
The background principles defense is remarkably powerful: if the government
can prove that the regulation is part of the state’s background of property or
nuisance laws, then the regulation is not a taking, and the state does not owe the
property owner compensation.215 With an existing background principle, the
government is not required to pay compensation for taking a property right because
there never was a property right to begin with.216 These arguments have been
handled admirably by other commentators,217 but the persistence of these
arguments requires a brief discussion.
1. The Federal Navigation Servitude
The federal navigation servitude has been suggested as grounds for establishing
a right to float in Colorado.218 The federal navigation servitude is based on the
principle that the federal government, by its authority under the Commerce
Clause,219 can ensure that navigable streams maintain the character necessary for

212. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1029 (1992).
213. Id. at 1015; see also Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy:
The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 321, 325 (2005).
214. Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 213, at 326.
215. See id. at 322.
216. Huffman, supra note 207, at 173.
217. See generally Hill, supra note 7, at 341–49 (discussing federal and state
navigability); Stephen H. Leonhardt & Jessica J. Spuhler, The Public Trust Doctrine: What It
Is, Where It Came From, and Why Colorado Does Not (and Should Not) Have One, 16 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 47 (2012) (discussing the public trust argument).
218. See Potter et al., supra note 6, at 473–75. The federal navigation servitude is also
one of the more popular arguments used by the public in defending a right to float. See, e.g.,
Ed Dentry, Colorado Needs to Go with the Flow, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 11, 2001, at
11C (“In U.S. law, two definitions most forcefully dictate whether a river is navigable and,
therefore, free for public travel (including the river bottom and banks to the high-water
mark). One, it should have a history of commercial use. Two, ‘a river that is navigable in
fact is navigable in law.’ In other words, if you can float it, you may float it. U.S. law
supersedes state law, even in the Republic of Colorado.”).
219. See supra Part II.A.1.
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navigation in interstate commerce.220 Consequently, the federal navigation
servitude provides public access to waters governed by the servitude221 and is a
defense to takings claims.222 If any rivers in Colorado were subject to the federal
navigation servitude, then the public would have a right to fish and float, and that
river’s landowners would have no grounds for a takings claim.223
It is unlikely that the federal navigation servitude applies to many rivers in
Colorado. The servitude applies so far as the federal navigation power applies,224
and exercise of the federal navigation power requires that the stream is capable of
being used as a continued highway for interstate commerce.225 To date, only
Navajo Reservoir and the far downstream section of the Colorado River where it
enters Utah have been deemed navigable for federal purposes.226 While it is true
that these are only the two waters that have been designated as navigable waters
and that there is the possibility that other waters are subject to federal control,227 it
is unlikely that many waters in Colorado are navigable according the federal test.228
While some rivers in Colorado may be able to support interstate commerce,229
many likely do not. In United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.,230 the
U.S. Supreme Court noted that the Rio Grande was not navigable within the state
of New Mexico, and “[t]he mere fact that logs, poles and rafts are floated down a
stream occasionally and in times of high water does not make it a navigable
river.”231 If the lower stretches are not navigable, then it is unlikely that the upper
stretches in Colorado are navigable. Others have provided convincing evidence that
the upper Colorado River is incapable of sustaining trade or travel for federal
purposes.232 If larger rivers like the Rio Grande and Colorado are incapable of

220. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 177 (1979).
221. See id. at 175.
222. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 63–
64 (1913); see also Eva H. Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation
Power and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 20 (1963).
223. See Morreale, supra note 222, at 20.
224. Id.
225. See supra text accompanying note 66.
226. Navigable Waterways in the Sacramento District, U.S. ARMY CORPS ENG’RS, http://
www.spk.usace.army.mil/Missions/Regulatory/Jurisdiction/NavigableWatersoftheUS.aspx.
227. See Potter et al., supra note 6, at 474.
228. See Leonhardt & Spuhler, supra note 217, at 62 (“[W]est of the 100th Meridian,
such navigability generally ends. . . . The rivers of the West are not like those of the Midwest
or East. In their natural state, they flood in the late spring and taper off to trickles by
midsummer. Some western rivers may now provide excellent sport for whitewater
enthusiasts, but their nature was never that of navigable rivers; nor was navigation a
common public value inextricably intertwined in the fabric of settlement between the High
Plains and the Sierras.”).
229. For example, there is some evidence that logs were floated on the North Platte River
from Colorado to Wyoming. See DAVID H. ELLIS & CATHERINE H. ELLIS, STEAMBOAT
SPRINGS 58–60 (2009).
230. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
231. Id. at 698.
232. See Leonhardt & Spuhler, supra note 217, at 61–62.
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meeting the federal test, then it is unlikely that the smaller interior tributaries are
capable of meeting the federal test.
2. State Navigability
Apart from the defined and established Daniel Ball test for federal navigability,
states are free to establish their own tests for navigability,233 which can vary
widely.234 Though many states have defined navigability for state use purposes as
the capability to float logs or small recreational craft,235 others have retained a
stricter commercial standard of navigability.236 But whatever the persuasive value
of other jurisdictions, a broad definition of state navigability does not form part of
the background principles of property law in the state of Colorado. While no
appellate court in Colorado has been confronted with the scope of the state’s
navigability law, the Colorado Supreme Court has consistently considered that “the
natural streams of this state are, in fact, nonnavigable within its territorial limits,
and practically all of them have their sources within its own boundaries, and that no
stream of any importance whose source is without those boundaries, flows into or
through this state.”237

233. Hill, supra note 7, at 342.
234. “There is an irreconcilable conflict between the decisions of the courts of different
states of this country upon this question.” Kinkead v. Turgeon, 109 N.W. 744, 744 (Neb.
1906).
235. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 36-1601(a) (2011).
236. See, e.g., supra note 68.
237. Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220, 222 (Colo. 1912), overruled on other grounds,
United States v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 17 (Colo. 1982); see also In re German
Ditch & Reservoir Co., 139 P. 2, 9 (Colo. 1913) (“The natural streams of the state are
nonnavigable within its limits.”). In addition to this general statement in Stockman, the
Colorado Supreme Court has specifically noted that a number of rivers are nonnavigable,
including the Arkansas River, Smith v. Town of Fowler, 333 P.2d 1034, 1036 (Colo. 1959),
the Eagle River, United States v. Dist. Ct. in & for Cnty. of Eagle, 458 P.2d 760, 762 (Colo.
1969), aff’d, 401 U.S. 520 (1971), the South Platte River, Hall v. Brannan Sand & Gravel
Co., 405 P.2d 749, 750 (Colo. 1965); Heimbecher v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 9 P.2d 280,
281 (Colo. 1932); Platte Water Co. v. N. Colo. Irrigation Co., 21 P. 711, 713 (Colo. 1889)
(“It is scarcely necessary to add that the South Platte River is not navigable in
Colorado . . . .”), and Tomichi Creek, Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 690 (Colo. 1905)
(Bailey, J., dissenting).
The Colorado Supreme Court has never given a standard of navigability, but it is
generally understood to have adopted a narrow commercial test. Craig, supra note 1, at 76.
The ease with which the Colorado Supreme Court has taken judicial notice of
nonnavigability stands out from the stacks of reporters on the topic in the common law
countries. Perhaps the Colorado court’s unspoken reasoning is somewhat akin to the rule in
Pennsylvania:
We think that the concept of navigability should not be limited alone by lake or
river, or by commercial use; or by the size of the water or its capacity to float a
boat. Rather it should depend upon whether the water is used or usable as a
broad highroad for commerce and the transport in quantity of goods and people,
which is the rule naturally applicable to rivers and to large lakes, or whether
with all of the mentioned factors counted the water remains a local focus of
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Because navigability was never at issue in any of these cases, there is no binding
law on state navigability in Colorado,238 but it seems unlikely that the Colorado
Supreme Court would abandon its long-standing assumption that there are no
navigable streams within the state. Consequently, a state definition of navigability
cannot be used as a background defense for a takings claim.
3. The Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine is one of the most popular arguments used by right-tofloat proponents.239 There is no single definition of a “public trust doctrine,”240 and
an expansive discussion is beyond the scope of this Note.241 In general, however,
the public trust doctrine recognizes that some resources should be preserved by the
state for public use because private ownership of these resources is inappropriate.242
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in PPL Montana affirmed that the
public trust doctrine is solely a matter of state law and does not depend on the U.S.
Constitution.243 Thus, while other states have used the public trust doctrine to
secure a public right to float,244 the scope of the public trust doctrine in Colorado
must be based on Colorado law.
Colorado has long rejected the public trust doctrine as grounds for a right to
float. In Emmert, the Colorado Supreme Court explicitly rejected the public trust
doctrine as a basis for a right to float,245 and there is no indication that the court has
abandoned its original holding.246 Furthermore, the public trust doctrine “is
attraction, which is the rule sensibly applicable to shallow streams and small
lakes and ponds. The basic difference is that between a trade-route and a point
of interest. The first is a public use and the second private.
Mountain Props., Inc. v. Tyler Hill Realty Corp., 2001 PA Super 45, ¶ 11, 767 A.2d 1096,
1100 (quoting Lakeside Park Co. v. Forsmark, 153 A.2d 486, 489 (1959)). An early note
plausibly argued that Stockman and German Ditch “must also be limited by the historical
period in which they were delivered. At the time these cases were decided, the legal
approach to the issue of navigability was confined to the traditional commercial, navigablein-fact standard.” Gast, supra note 159, at 267. Still, the Colorado Supreme Court has
consistently repeated over the past century that there are no navigable rivers in Colorado.
The point is this: the modern trend may be toward a broad, recreational-based test, but that
does not necessarily invalidate the commercial test as a matter of law.
238. Thus, it is not exactly correct that “[t]he Colorado Supreme Court has held no
navigable streams exist in Colorado.” Hill, supra note 7 at 348. To be more precise, the
Colorado Supreme Court has consistently taken judicial notice that no navigable streams
exist in Colorado.
239. See, e.g., Potter et al., supra note 6, at 479–92; Scott, supra note 159.
240. Leonhardt & Spuhler, supra note 217, at 50.
241. For a helpful discussion of the public trust doctrine and why it should not be adopted
in Colorado, see generally Leonhardt & Spuhler, supra note 217.
242. Scott, supra note 159, at 626.
243. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (2012); see also Leonhardt &
Spuhler, supra note 217, at 49.
244. See, e.g., Kerley v. Wolfe, 84 N.W.2d 748, 752 (Mich. 1957); Mont. Coal. for
Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984).
245. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979) (en banc).
246. Justice Hobbs writes that “Emmert is clear on the point . . . that the Colorado
Supreme Court will not rely on public trust theory to resolve the issue of recreational use of

500

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:473

fundamentally incompatible with the Colorado Constitution’s [system of prior
appropriation].”247
A related argument is that the language of the Colorado Constitution can support
a right to float without relying on a public trust theory.248 In other words, the
language in article XVI, section 5 should be interpreted as granting a public right of
access to the state’s waters. While this argument does not rely on the language of
the public trust theory, its effect is the same and is equally foreclosed: in Colorado,
the public ownership of water protected by the constitution only “serves the public
interest by allowing public and private entities to appropriate water for beneficial
use.”249
4. English Common Law and Prescription
One of the more interesting arguments in favor of a right to float is that the right
is protected by section 2-4-211 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, which adopts
English common law as the law of the state until repealed by the General
Assembly.250 Because “English common law gave all subjects rights to navigate
and to make other uses of waterways such as fishing and hunting,”251 the argument
goes, “Colorado should adopt the English common law standard of navigability in
fact.”252 The proposed right-to-float bill 10-1188 used section 2-4-211 and the
English common law as the legal authority for establishing a right to float in
Colorado.253
Despite the broad public right of navigation in tidal rivers,254 English law
established no general right of public navigation in nontidal rivers,255 but a right of
navigation could be established in the same way as a highway: by dedication by the
owner of the riverbed, by Act of Parliament, by usage that could give rise to the
presumption of a lost grant, and by usage since time immemorial.256 Immemorial
the public’s flowing water resources as it runs through the beds and banks of the stream.”
Hobbs, supra note 35, at 126.
247. Id.
248. See Potter et al., supra note 6, at 489–90; Burns, supra note 159, at 597.
249. Hobbs, supra note 35, at 127.
250. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-211 (West 2004) (“The common law of England so
far as the same is applicable and of a general nature, and all acts and statutes of the British
parliament, made in aid of or to supply the defects of the common law prior to the fourth
year of James the First, excepting the second section of the sixth chapter of forty-third
Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of thirteenth Elizabeth, and the ninth chapter of thirty-seventh
Henry the Eighth, and which are of a general nature, and not local to that kingdom, shall be
the rule of decision, and shall be considered as of full force until repealed by legislative
authority.”).
251. Potter et al., supra note 6, at 493 (quoting DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 218 (3d ed. 1997)).
252. Id. at 494.
253. H.B. 10-1188, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. § 2(a) (Colo. 2010) (House
reengrossed version).
254. See supra Part II.A.1.
255. 39 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND ¶¶ 730–31 (3d ed. 1957).
256. Attorney-General ex rel. Yorkshire Derwent Trust Ltd. v. Brotherton, [1990] Ch.
185 (C.A.) 197, rev’d on other grounds, [1992] 1 A.C. 425 (H.L.) (1991).
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usage allowed a user to establish a right through prescription so long as the use
could be dated to 1189,257 which made establishing a public highway on a nontidal
river through common law prescription particularly difficult.258 There appears to be
no English case law that holds that a highway was established by prescription by
recreational use.259 More importantly, Colorado has adopted its own statutory rule
for creating a highway through prescription, which thus supersedes the English law
invoked in the right-to-float bill.
In Colorado, public highways may be established by prescription,260 and such
action is not a taking that requires just compensation.261 If rivers are public
highways, prescription is potentially a powerful defense to a takings claim.
In Colorado, a public highway can only be established if the following three
elements are met:
(1) members of the public must have used the road under a claim of
right and in a manner adverse to the landowner’s property interest; (2)
the public must have used the road without interruption for the statutory
period of twenty years; and (3) the landowner must have had actual
knowledge of the public’s use of the road and made no objection to
such use.262
Navigable rivers have long been described as public highways in English263 and
American law.264 The Colorado Supreme Court has acknowledged this rule in
dicta,265 though there are no published cases in Colorado where a public right of
navigation was established through prescription.
While navigable rivers have been described as highways, the more difficult
question is whether a nonnavigable river—which, by its very nature is not a public
highway—falls within statutes that establish public highways by prescription.266

257. Id.
258. 19 HALSBURY’S, supra note 255, ¶ 60.
259. Id.
260. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-2-201(1)(c) (West 2004).
261. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Saguache Cnty. v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975, 984–85
(Colo. 1984) (en banc).
262. McIntyre v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Gunnison Cnty., 86 P.3d 402, 407 (Colo. 2004)
(en banc).
263. For traditional English cases, see generally Attorney-General ex rel. Yorkshire
Derwent Trust Ltd. v. Brotherton, [1990] Ch. 185, 193–96 (C.A.) 197 (collecting cases),
rev’d [1992] 1 A.C. 425 (H.L.) (1991).
264. E.g., United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82 (1931); Coe v. Town of Errol, 116 U.S.
517, 518–19 (1886); The Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 442 (1874).
265. See Hale v. Sullivan, 362 P.2d 402, 405 (Colo. 1961) (en banc) (including as
highways “ferries, canals and navigable rivers”) (citing Strange v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Grant
Cnty., 91 N.E. 242, 247 (Ind. 1910)). Neither Hale nor Strange involved rivers.
266. Compare Attorney-General ex rel. Yorkshire Derwent Trust Ltd. v. Brotherton,
[1992] 1 A.C. 425 (H.L.) (1991) (holding that prescription statute could not apply because
nonnavigable streams were fundamentally distinguishable from public highways), with
Buffalo River Conservation & Recreation Council v. Nat’l Park Serv., 558 F.2d 1342, 1344–
45 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding, without extensive explanation, that under Arkansas law the laws

502

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:473

The most analogous authority to Colorado is State ex rel. Meek v. Hays,267where
the Kansas Supreme Court considered whether prescription applied to rivers after
rejecting the so-called modern recreational test for navigability in favor of
Emmert’s rule that the public has no right to float in nonnavigable streams.268 The
Meek court agreed that a river could be established as a public highway by
prescription so long as a claimant met Kansas’s strict requirements for public rights
gained by prescription.269 In Kratina v. Board of Commissioners,270 the Kansas
Supreme Court held that public rights could only be gained by prescription where
public officials had taken some positive action, either formally or informally, to
show the intention of the public to establish a public highway.271 This may be a
difficult burden to meet in the case of a river, for
[n]either occasional use of the creek by a large number of canoeists nor
frequent use by a small number of canoeists gives rise to a prescriptive
right in the public to use nonnavigable streams. A public prescriptive
right arises during the prescribed period when public use becomes so
burdensome that government must regulate traffic, keep the peace,
invoke sanitary measures, and insure that the natural condition of the
stream is maintained.272
Like Kansas, Colorado has adopted the strict Kratina rule.273 Thus, in Colorado,
“the public entity must establish its claim of right by some overt action that puts the
landowner on notice that it intends to include the public way within its road system;
only then can the public way be considered a ‘road’ or ‘public highway,’ thus
beginning the prescriptive period.”274
As in Meek, it will likely be difficult for the state to prove that a public entity
has taken some action that demonstrates the public intends that a river is a public
highway. Even if public entities take some sort of action like managing public boat
ramps or access points, they are unlikely to do so while claiming the river as a
public highway. For example, Colorado State Parks has permissive agreements
with landowners on the Arkansas River and posts areas of private water along the
riverbanks on the Yampa River.275 Because the prescription period does not start
until the public entity takes action, historic use of a stream will not count toward
the claim, and the cases in which the government has taken action may be too
recent to win the prescription claim.

of prescriptive rights over land apply by analogy to nonnavigable rivers).
267. 785 P.2d 1356 (Kan. 1990).
268. Id. at 1363.
269. Id.
270. 548 P.2d 1232 (Kan. 1976).
271. Id. at 1237.
272. Meek, 785 P.2d at 1363.
273. McIntyre v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Gunnison Cnty., 86 P.3d 402, 407–08 (Colo.
2004) (en banc).
274. Id. at 408.
275. See Jerd Smith, Fighting for the Right, HEADWATERS, Fall 2010, at 11, 16.
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V. JUST COMPENSATION
A. Just Compensation and Land Values
Just compensation is a limiting principle of government takings276 and remains a
check on legislative overreach.277 Just compensation measures the value of the
property right lost by measuring the diminution in the fair market value of the
property after the taking.278 In a normal partial takings case, the value of just
compensation includes not only the value of the property taken but also the damage
to the remainder of the property.279 Thus, an exercise of eminent domain that takes
an easement for a highway would require compensation for the easement taken and
the damage to the remainder of the property: the property, once a single tract, has
now been effectively divided into two separate, smaller parcels.280 In other words,
the price of just compensation in establishing the right to float or fish would be the
sum of the value of the property right taken and the diminution of the property as a
whole caused by the loss of that property right. Personal losses are not included in
this calculation: only damage to the property’s market value is compensable.281
Determining the amount of just compensation in a partial takings case is one of
the most difficult types of condemnation appraisals.282 Landowners may vastly
overvalue their property,283 and takings parties will secure professional appraisers
who are willing to testify in a way favorable to that party.284 Naturally, then,
property rights advocates overestimate the value of the property taken, and right-tofloat advocates tend to dramatically underestimate the value of the property
taken.285
Writing in dissent in Emmert, Justice Carrigan suggested the diminution in value
caused by floaters was de minimis: “[T]he ‘trespassers’ were merely making a
fleeting, non-consumptive use of the quality of buoyancy inherent in the water. A
prosecution for trespass is no more appropriate than would be such a prosecution

276. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY § 14.1 (3d ed. 2010).
277. See, e.g., Leonhardt & Spuhler, supra note 217, at 69 (“[T]he issue of potential
takings claims by riparian landowners . . . remains a constant check on the development of
an expansive public access right in Colorado.”).
278. See supra notes 194–97 and accompanying text.
279. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-114(1), (2)(c) (West 2013); Jagow v. E-470 Pub.
Highway Auth., 49 P.3d 1151, 1156 (Colo. 2002) (en banc).
280. See WILLIAM G. MURRAY, FARM APPRAISAL AND VALUATION 400 (4th ed. 1961).
281. Fowler Irrevocable Trust 1992-1 v. City of Boulder, 992 P.2d 1188, 1197 (Colo.
App. 1999).
282. MURRAY, supra note 280, at 402.
283. See Jeffrey Evans Stake & Fiery Cushman, Determining “Just Compensation” 7
n.19 (Ind. Univ. Maurer Sch. Law–Bloomington Legal Research Paper Series, Research
Paper No. 173, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1633920 (describing an English case where the property owner asked for £9,000,000 but was
awarded only £121,000).
284. See MURRAY, supra note 280, at 410–12 (describing the vast gap in values offered
by the competing appraisers).
285. Compare supra text accompanying note 41, with infra text accompanying note 287.
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against one making use of the buoyancy of air . . . .”286 Likewise, at least two
commentators have cited Madison v. Graham287 for the proposition “that statutes
allowing recreational access to individuals on rivers running through private
property do not justify compensation because the imposition on the property right
at stake is de minimis when individuals merely float through a landowner’s
property.”288
Neither Justice Carrigan’s dissent in Emmert nor the Ninth Circuit’s holding in
Madison is particularly helpful. Justice Carrigan was concerned that recognizing
the ad coelum doctrine in Colorado would lead to absurd and unjust results.289 The
force of Justice Carrigan’s argument is mostly rhetorical. While there is no doubt
that some brief intrusions of a landowner’s air space may be de minimis, it does not
follow that all that is at stake is simply the “buoyancy of air.” This is why courts
have consistently found that landowners have a cause of action against invasions of
the space above a landowner’s property.290
Relying on Madison is similarly problematic. While a Colorado court would
look to federal precedent in a takings case,291 Madison is not reliable authority for
the proposition that a right to float constitutes a de minimis diminution in a
property’s value. In Madison, the plaintiffs challenged the Montana Stream Access
Law292 as violating their Fourteenth Amendment right of substantive due process
but failed to plead that the law was an unconstitutional taking.293 The federal
district court rejected the Fourteenth Amendment argument for failure to state a
claim for which relief could be granted.294 The court noted in passing that “the
touching of the private streambed by a wader . . . is de minimis and causes no more
interference with private property rights than does a floater”295 and expressed
skepticism about whether a taking had even taken place.296 The court made clear
that a takings claim had not been pleaded and that the court was not deciding a

286. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1032 (Colo. 1979) (Carrigan, J., dissenting) (en
banc); see also Helton, supra note 1, at 871–72 (agreeing with Justice Carrigan and arguing
that a right to float “should not amount to a compensable taking”).
287. 316 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2002).
288. Helton, supra note 1, at 871 (citing Jas. Jeffrey Adams & Cody Winterton,
Navigability in Oregon: Between a River Rock and a Hard Place, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
615, 651 n.234 (2005)); see Adams & Winterton, supra, at 651 n.234 (“The Ninth Circuit
affirmed that the legislation did not amount to a taking of property under the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendments because, far from denying the property owner all economically
viable use of the land, the effect of the statute on the riparian owners’ property rights was ‘de
minimis.’” (citing Madison, 316 F.3d at 872)). See infra text accompanying notes 292–99
for a different interpretation of Madison.
289. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1032.
290. See supra text accompanying note 176.
291. See Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of the Cnty. of La
Plata, 38 P.3d 59, 62 (Colo. 2001).
292. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-302(1) (2011).
293. Madison v. Graham, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1322 (D. Mont. 2001), aff’d 316 F.3d
867 (9th Cir. 2002).
294. Id. at 1325.
295. Id. at 1324.
296. Id. at 1325–26.
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takings claim.297 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs should have
proceeded under the takings clause, but “in light of the appellants’ steadfast
disclaimer that they do not rely on the Takings Clause . . . , we do not construe their
claims as takings claims. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that . . . the district
court correctly dismissed their complaint with prejudice.”298 Thus, neither the
district court nor the court of appeals ever addressed the takings claim as such, and
the district court’s remark that neither a floating right nor a wading right interferes
with the property is only dicta.299
The larger problem with these arguments is that they fail to address the reasons
that landowners want to exclude floaters in the first place. No landowner would
complain about a taking of the “buoyancy of water”: landowners are concerned
with privacy,300 exclusive fishing easements,301 being held liable for injuries
sustained by floaters,302 and the ability to build cattle fences and water diversion
structures across the stream.303 To the extent that these values are reflected in the
real estate market, their loss should form the value of just compensation in a
takings claim.
B. The Value of the Right to Exclude and the Exclusive Right to Fish
As a preliminary matter, some of the landowners’ concerns truly are de minimis.
For instance, Colorado already limits landowner liability for landowners who allow
uncompensated recreational use.304 Additionally, establishing a right to float would
not prevent landowners from building livestock fences across streams that run
through their property. Landowners can install fencing with float gates that allow
floaters but prevent livestock from passing through,305 which has been used
effectively in Montana.306
More important is the value attributable to landowner privacy and exclusive
fishing easements. The value of landowner privacy will depend on how the market
thinks of that privacy. If privacy means the ability to enjoy land without anyone
floating through it, then establishing a right to float should not substantially
diminish the property as a whole because a landowner’s right to exclude is in some

297. Id. at 1325.
298. Madison v. Graham, 316 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 2002).
299. The court’s assertion that there is no distinction between a wader and a floater is not
particularly persuasive. The court might be right as a matter of Montana law, but other states
have been willing to draw this distinction. This is why the Wyoming Supreme Court limited
public access to floaters but prohibited waders, see Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 146–47
(Wyo. 1961), and why the Utah legislature overturned the Utah Supreme Court’s holding
that wading was allowed across private property in Conatser v. Johnson, 2008 UT 72, 194
P.3d 897 (Utah 2008), see UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-29-101 to -205 (West Supp. 2012).
300. Hill, supra note 7, at 332.
301. Id.
302. GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE, supra note 124, at 5.
303. Hill, supra note 7, at 332.
304. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-41-103 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012).
305. GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE, supra note 124, at 7; Gast, supra note 159, at 263.
306. See Smith River State Park Frequently Asked Questions, MONT. STATE PARKS,
http://stateparks.mt.gov/smith-river/smithRiverFAQ.html.
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ways already qualified, such that a landowner cannot say that the property today
has no floaters going through it. After the passage of section 18-4-504.5, floating is
no longer a criminal trespass, so landowners cannot simply call the sheriff to arrest
floaters.307 Instead, a landowner’s sole remedy to exclude floaters is an action for
civil trespass. While a civil trespass claim can be effective, as it was on the Lake
Fork in 2001 and the Taylor in 2010, a civil trespass claim can be costly and
difficult to prove.308 Thus, the market today accepts that a landowner cannot stop
every boat that floats through the property because a landowner cannot stop floaters
with criminal prosecution and is unlikely to stop floaters with a civil action.
Furthermore, many landowners have already reached voluntary agreements with
boaters,309 which suggests that many landowners expect and accept a certain
amount of boaters each year. Thus, landowners seeking compensation cannot say
that they have lost an absolute right to privacy; a right to float is not the same as
building a highway through a pasture where there was no highway before.
The better argument is that having a civil remedy available is necessary for a
right to privacy. Even though some floaters will inevitably get through, the
landowner retains at least some right to exclude some floaters if the landowner
needs to. The problem for a landowner seeking substantial just compensation is the
difficulty of proving that the loss of this legal remedy is sufficient to diminish the
fair market value of the property. This is a formidable task: passing right-to-float
legislation will likely not increase the amount of boaters traveling through the
property because the existing right to a civil remedy appears to serve no deterrent
effect on boaters now.310
Since just compensation is measured by fair market value and fair market value
is measured by comparable sales, a landowner will have to show that the value of
the property has decreased in comparison to other similar properties. This will be
difficult for several reasons. First, there is some anecdotal evidence that a
landowner’s civil remedy does not contribute to property values because some
landowners assume that boaters already have the right to float. In Cannibal
Outdoors, the property owner was apparently only concerned with preventing
liability in case floaters were hurt while traveling through the property.311 While the
controversy over floating may be better known since the cases in 2001 and 2010, it
is still not so obvious that a right to exclude floaters is contributing to land values.
Furthermore, it is unclear how much the civil right to exclude all floaters is
reflected in the current fair market value of properties. Montana provides a telling

307. Woodard AGO, supra note 150, at 5.
308. See Hannay Memo, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that a landowner seeking an injunction
for civil trespass would have to establish all of the factual and legal elements of the tort).
309. GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE, supra note 124, at 6.
310. Over 400,000 commercial user days were logged last year alone. See COLO. RIVER
OUTFITTERS ASS’N, supra note 15.
311. See Rutberg, supra note 13 (“When the landowner got a call from the BLM in 1998,
warning him that one of his cow fences across the river was in the process of being washed
away, he called his lawyer; he was concerned about his responsibility to keep the river safe
for boaters. ‘Our lawyer said he didn’t think they had a right to be there in the first place,’ he
says.”).
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example. Even though Montana affirmed a right to float in 1984,312 property sales
in the 1990s “were driven by the specific goal of obtaining exclusive access to the
region’s famed fisheries,”313 which resulted in “phenomenal increases in the value
of land.”314 Thus, in Montana at least, the public’s right to float did not diminish
land values, and buyers did not perceive public access as diminishing their privacy
expectations. The results appear to be the same in Idaho, New Mexico, and
Wyoming.315
Second, a properly drafted statute would not reduce property values by
decreasing demand. In a typical takings case, a landowner can prove the diminution
of a single piece of property by comparing it to those properties that have not been
so affected. For example, a landowner can calculate the cost of diminution caused
by a highway easement by showing a comparable property without a highway
easement. If a right-to-float statute applied to all rivers in the state, then there
would be no unaffected properties, and prospective buyers would not be able to
choose between parcels that do or do not allow floating.
Third, it is unlikely that the civil remedy to exclude floaters is contributing to
property values because of the nature of the market. Today, the highest and best use
for the most desirable properties is as a recreational ranch rather than as a
traditional working ranch.316 The market for recreational ranches is driven by
buyers who are willing to look throughout the West for property, which creates a
stabilizing effect on prices and creates comparable values for comparable properties
throughout the entire region.317 In other words, it does not appear that property
owners are choosing Colorado because of the civil remedy to exclude floaters.
Moreover, arguments against a right to float may overvalue the effect privacy has
in driving the recreational ranch market. While some purchasers may value privacy
and exclusivity, others may be more concerned with creating a new lifestyle.318
Others may be more interested in making savvy investments that will appreciate
over time, purchasing legacy ranches that they can pass to their heirs, buying
properties that provide exclusive big game hunting opportunities, or even with

312. See Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984).
313. Gosnell et al., supra note 11, at 992; see also id. at 1000 (“[N]ewcomers purchasing
ranches in southwestern Montana often do so with a strong interest in privacy and
exclusivity.”).
314. Id. at 992.
315. See Brooke Lange, The Sporting Life, VACATION HOMES, Oct.–Nov. 2006, at 25
(describing the market for river properties). Comparison to these states is somewhat less
valuable than Montana in showing that public access will not diminish property values
because their public access laws have been in place for decades, see sources cited supra note
2, and property values may have had time to recover, but comparison to these states is
instructive to the extent that potential buyers are searching for properties throughout the
West and comparable properties tend to sell for comparable prices across the West.
316. See Sarah Drummond, Hunting for Recreational Properties, COM. INVESTMENT
REAL ESTATE, Jan.–Feb. 2005, at 32.
317. See Clark Wheeler, Newsletter: 2012—Annual Land Study Report, NORMAN C.
WHEELER & ASSOCIATES, http://www.ncwheeler.com/Pages/Newsletter.aspx (describing
market trends in Montana and throughout the West).
318. See Trish Bennett, City Slickers, UNIQUE HOMES, July 2005, at 332, 332.
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owning a prize property to show their family or business associates.319 Even
purchasers of a fishing property look at the relevant amenities offered in the
property’s market in making their decision.320
Finally, it is unlikely that granting the public a right to fish would require
substantial compensation. At the outset, it is unlikely that such a right would even
rise to the level of a taking requiring compensation because the statute would be
evaluated on its effect on the full rights of the property, not the single right to
fish.321 This alone will be a significant hurdle for most property owners.
Even if granting the public a right to fish is a taking, the taking may not require
substantial compensation. While some properties have advertised exclusive fishing
as a key amenity, those same properties have often expended tremendous amounts
of money in developing the fishery itself.322 In other words, the value attributable to
the property may be more attributable to the investments in the quality of the
fishery rather than the exclusive right to the fishery itself. Thus, not only will the
landowner have to prove that there has been a diminution in the fair market value
of the property, the landowner will also have to prove that the diminution is
attributable to the public’s new right to fish. This is further complicated by a
general public sense that the public already has the right to fish:323 even though
incorrect, it informs the general understanding of the market, so the market may
have already adjusted for the public’s right to fish.
Even though landowners might value a right to exclude and an exclusive right to
fish, it is not apparent that these rights contribute significantly to the fair market
value of the property. If that is the case, then the legislature could act effectively,
without the fear of overwhelming compensation. It is more likely that the
administrative costs of providing compensation would be the most significant
cost.324 These administrative costs may be sufficient to prevent the legislature from
acting, but this is where the debate should take place, taking into account the cost
of establishing a right to float and the benefits that the right would provide.
CONCLUSION
Right-to-float advocates have convincingly argued that establishing a public
right to float in Colorado best promotes public policy, 325 but their arguments for
the legal authority to establish such a right have been unpersuasive. While right-to-

319. RanchesForSale, Hall and Hall—Eric O’Keefe of the Land Report, YOUTUBE (Mar.
20, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=INvBmiRVxMI.
320. Cf. Lange, supra note 315, at 27 (“Fisherman looking to invest in tax-friendly
Wyoming, which boasts no state income or estate taxes, typically pursue active water,
acreage and access to Jackson Hole’s many amenities and activities, including golf, fine
dining, a world-class symphony, museums and film festivals.”).
321. See supra notes 194–98, 203–10 and accompanying text.
322. See, e.g., RanchesForSale, supra note 28.
323. See, e.g., Public Ownership of Rivers in Colorado, NAT’L ORG. FOR RIVERS,
http://www.adventuresports.com/river/nors/states/co-law.htm.
324. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1-101 to -122 (West 2007 & Supp. 2012)
(providing the complex statutory regime for providing compensation).
325. See, e.g., Helton, supra note 1, at 867–68.
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float advocates have shown that Colorado is out of step with the rest of the West,
they have failed to adequately consider the formidable barriers created by
Colorado’s unique set of precedents. Further, right-to-float advocates have failed to
fully address the scope of landowner’s rights, and, in doing so, they risk achieving
only a partial victory—perhaps securing a right to float but leaving potential areas
of conflict unresolved.
At the same time, property advocates have overstated their hand, and the
legislature has fallen for their bluff. Even if landowners do have the right to
exclude floaters, the value of this right is not sufficient to prevent the legislature
from acting, and right-to-float advocates should not avoid confronting the issue of
compensable property rights head-on. By confronting this issue directly, right-tofloat advocates can create a strong, legally grounded right to float that can
withstand future challenges, promote public policy throughout the state, and
effectively address the rights of both landowners and the public. Property rights
advocates have warned that “[i]f the General Assembly is to enact a law opening
streams flowing through private lands to public use, it must provide for, and be
prepared to pay, just compensation.” 326 Instead of being intimidated into inaction,
the legislature should embrace this requirement as a necessary step to opening
rivers to the people of Colorado.

326. Hill, supra note 7, at 350.

